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Abstract
This paper examines the different types of incentives that countries
face when deciding to take part in a federal fiscal system. The optimal
degree of participation depends on the structural parameters of the econ-
omy and on the properties of the federal fiscal system. Firstly, the paper
examines the case of federal fiscal systems that work as simple insurance
arrangements. Secondly, a mixed insurance and redistribution system is
considered. Thirdly, fiscal system participation is added as a parameter
of the utility function. Finally, the paper examines the case of a fiscal
federation that responds to shocks on the terms of trade. The models are
developed in a continuous time stochastic framework and simple closed
form solutions are obtained. Simulation methods are used to illustrate
the stationary equilibrium path of variables. The paper concludes that
risk sharing is a strong motive for taking part in a fiscal federation. Fiscal
system participation increases when the country benefits from redistribu-
tion or when participation is a parameter of the utility function. Finally,
it is shown that there are incentives to participate in fiscal federations
that respond to shocks on the terms of trade. In this case, the higher the
volatility of the shocks on the terms of trade, the lower the variance of
the capital stock growth rate in the optimum.
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1 Introduction
Fiscal federations stand as an advanced stage in a process of economic integra-
tion. This type of integrated fiscal system exists within each country, enabling
the transfer of resources among regions and playing a vital role in macroeco-
nomic stabilisation policy. The economic integration process that is underway in
the European Union has revived the interest in the role and functioning of fiscal
federations. This literature is closely linked to the theory of optimal currency
areas, which dates back to seminal contributions by Mundell (1961), Mckinnon
(1963) and Kenen (1969). The main point is that countries which take part in a
monetary union lack the instruments to offset the effects of negative asymmet-
ric shocks that might affect them. In fact, when the shocks are symmetric, the
common central bank can run the monetary policy in a way that benefits all
countries. The problem arises when the shocks are asymmetric. In this case the
adequate monetary policy is different for each country. In fact, central banks
in monetary unions do not normally intervene to offset the effects of country
specific shocks. Instead, they tend to run a pre-defined monetary policy, the aim
of which is to assure price stability. In such a context, fiscal policy becomes an
important instrument for offsetting the effects of negative asymmetric shocks.
Nevertheless, fiscal policy in monetary unions is not free of constraints. In fact,
excessive budget deficits can generate problems in terms of the sustainability
of public finances. Such problems can jeopardise the monetary union and are
avoided by imposing limits on the budget deficits that countries can run.
At this point two questions can be raised. The first is to know how frequent
and how serious asymmetric shocks are in monetary unions. The second question
is to know what the proper mechanisms are to fight the consequences of negative
asymmetric shocks. The answer to the first question has been addressed by
empirical studies focused on Europe and the United States, such as Emerson
et al. (1990), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) and Krugman (1993). The
results obtained are not conclusive, but other studies which have focused on
European regions (such as De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1991) and De Nardis,
Goglio and Malgarini (1996)) conclude that there are asymmetric shocks at the
regional level. In terms of the mechanisms that enable the adjustment to the
effects of asymmetric shocks, the answer is twofold. Firstly, if the labour market
is sufficiently flexible, then a negative shock that affects a particular country can
be adjusted through a decrease in real wages in that same country. Secondly,
the effects of asymmetric shocks can be totally or partially offset by a federal
fiscal authority by transfering funds to the country affected. We will focus on
this last type of solution, which can be seen as a risk sharing arrangement.
There is an extensive literature on the desirability and effectiveness of fiscal
federations in Europe and the Unites States. A short and incomplete list of
such studies includes Bayoumi and Masson (1995), von Hagen and Hammond
(1995), Persson and Tabellini (1996), Fata´s (1997), Sφrensen and Yosha (1998),
von Hagen (1998) and Forni and Reichlin (1999). Most of these studies are
empirical and conclude that there is significant intranational risk sharing in the
United States, but it is of much smaller magnitude than the redistributive effect
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of the federal fiscal system. These studies also indicate that intranational risk
sharing is variable across European countries and that the national fiscal and
tax systems provide substantial protection against asymmetric shocks. However,
the restrictions imposed on domestic fiscal policy will change this reality and
the need for a fiscal federation will increase.
In this paper we take a theoretical approach and examine the different types
of incentives that countries face when deciding to take part in a federal fiscal
system. The models are developed in a continuous time stochastic framework,
where the control variables are constant proportions of the capital stock in the
stationary equilibrium. This approach generates simple closed form solutions
that depend on the structural parameters of the economy, such as technology,
preferences and uncertainty. This also allows a good analysis of the different
effects at work and provides explanations for some of the situations observed
in reality. The paper concludes that risk sharing is a strong motive for taking
part in a fiscal federation. Therefore, the degree of relative risk aversion and the
covariance between domestic and aggregate federal shocks play a vital role in
the fiscal system participation decision. In addition, fiscal system participation
increases when the country benefits from redistribution or when participation is
a parameter of the utility function. Finally, it is shown that there are incentives
to participate in fiscal federations that allow a reduction in the effect of shocks
on the terms of trade. In this case, the higher the volatility of these shocks, the
lower the variance of the capital stock growth rate in the optimum.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we introduce the con-
tinuous time stochastic framework and the structural parameters of the econ-
omy. Then, in the third section, we model a fiscal federation that operates as a
simple insurance system. In such a system, the single country optimally decides
the level of participation, receiving transfers when it faces an output shock that
is more damaging than the average output shock in the rest of the federation.
On the contrary, the country transfers funds if the shock is less damaging than
the average shock in the system. In the fourth section we model an alternative
fiscal system where there are both insurance and redistribution components. In
this section it is assumed that transfers depend on the output growth rate of
the fiscal federation, which contains deterministic and stochastic components.
Next, in the fifth section, it is assumed that countries take utility from partic-
ipating in the fiscal system. In particular, the degree of participation in the
system will be included as a parameter of the utility function. Then, Section
Six presents a model where there are domestic and foreign consumption goods,
as well as uncertainty on the terms of trade. In this case the fiscal federation
is assumed to respond to shocks on the terms of trade. Finally, Section Seven
presents some concluding remarks.
2 The Continuous Time Stochastic Economy
In this section we introduce the general framework and describe the main fea-
tures of the model. Firstly, we assume that in this continuous time stochastic
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economy there are two sources of uncertainty. The first source of uncertainty
lies on the domestic production function. Thus, it is assumed that there are
technological shocks, which are described by a Brownian motion. The second
source of uncertainty comes from the output shocks that affect the fiscal feder-
ation. The covariance between these two sources of uncertainty is generically
defined, allowing us to examine the effects of asymmetric shocks. Secondly, it
is also assumed that this is a non-monetary economy. This assumption is not
limitative if we centre on the case of a monetary union with a centrally de-
fined and low-inflation-oriented monetary policy. In this case money plays no
important role in macroeconomic performance. The production function of the
economy depends on a single input, which is the capital stock available in the
country. We assume a technology with constant returns to scale, to which we
add a technology shock, proportional to the deterministic output. Thus:
dY = αKdt+ αKdy (1)
whereK is the domestic capital stock available to production in each period, α is
a technological parameter and dy is a stochastic process, defined as a Brownian
motion with zero mean and variance σ2y.
Next we introduce the problem of the representative consumer, which max-
imises the expected discounted value of a constant relative risk aversion utility
function1. This utility function depends on consumption in each period. There-
fore, the consumer problem is:
Max Eo
∫ ∞
0
1
γ
C (t)γ e−βtdt (2)
where γ ≤ 1 and γ 6= 0. This parameter reflects the behaviour towards risk,
while β is the intertemporal discount rate. The control variables of the model
are consumption and the degree of participation in the federal fiscal system. The
degree of participation in the federal fiscal system is measured as the amount
of funds transferred to the central authority in each period. These funds have
a given rate of return, which depends on the characteristics of the fiscal feder-
ation. This type of continuous time stochastic model, which was developed by
Turnovsky (1995), sets the control variables as proportions of the state variable.
Therefore, our model will consider the control variables to be the consumption-
capital ratio and the fiscal system participation-capital ratio.
1The elasticity of substitution between consumption at any two points in time is constant
and equal to 1
1−γ . The empirical evidence suggests that this elasticity lies around or below
unity. In fact, the bulk of the empirical evidence suggests a relatively low value for the elas-
ticity of substitution. When attitudes towards risk are described, (1 − γ) has an alternative
interpretation. It is then the coefficient of relative risk aversion, defined as −u
′′
(C)C
u
′
(C)
. There-
fore, this function is also called the constant relative risk aversion utility function (CRRA).
Note also that when γ = 0, the logarithmic utility function is obtained. This property will be
used at the end of the paper to simplify some results.
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3 A Fiscal Federation as a Simple Insurance Sys-
tem
3.1 The Insurance System
This section presents the intertemporal resource constraint for the case of a
federal fiscal system that works as a simple insurance system. As described
above, in such a system, the single country receives funds when it faces an
output shock that is more damaging than the average output shock affecting
the rest of the fiscal federation. When the reverse happens, the country transfers
funds to the federation. This can be easily interpreted as an insurance system
where the degree of participation is equivalent to the quantity of insurance that
is bought. Therefore, the fiscal system is described by the following equation:
dR = −T (dy − dr) (3)
where dR represents the amount of transfers made with the central fiscal au-
thority in each period, T is the quantity of insurance that is bought in each
period, dy is the domestic technology shock and dr is the average shock affect-
ing the fiscal federation. Finally, dr is defined as a Brownian motion stochastic
process, with zero mean and variance σ2r .
Therefore, the intertemporal resource constraint is written as:
dK = αKdt+ αKdy − sTdt− T (dy − dr)− Cdt (4)
where s is the price paid for each unit of insurance. As noted above, the control
variables are set as proportions of the state variable. Therefore, equation 4
is divided by the capital stock K and the intertemporal resource constraint is
rewritten as:
dK
K
= α− C
K
− snT + dk (5)
where the stochastic components have been put together and presented simply
as:
dk = αdy − nT (dy − dr) (6)
with nT defined as T/K. Note that, given the form of the production function,
equation 5 also defines the growth rate of the economy.
3.2 Optimum Conditions
In this section we proceed with the technical details of the solution of the model.
Not all steps will be mentioned because detailed explanations have already been
presented elsewhere2.
2For more details on the technical solution of the model see, for instance, Turnovsky (1995),
Malliaris and Brock (1982) or Chow (1979).
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First, it is necessary to write the stochastic Lagrangian function, which is
given by:
£ =
1
γ
C (t)γ e−βt + LK
[
e−βtX (K)
]
(7)
where LK
[
e−βtX (K)
]
is the differential generator of the value function. Fur-
thermore, the differential generator of the value function can be written as:
LK
[
e−βtX (K, t)
]
=
∂V (K, t)
∂t
+
(
α− C
K
− snT
)
K
∂V (K, t)
∂K
(8)
+
1
2
σ2kK
2 ∂
2V (K, t)
∂K2
where V (K, t) is the value function of the problem and σ2k is the variance of
capital stock. Note that the utility function is time separable, so the value
function depends only t for the effect of time discounting. Thus, it is assumed
that V (K, t) = e−βtX (K), which is the way it is presented in the stochastic
Lagrangian function.
At this point we compute the variance of total capital stock as:
σ2k = (α− nT )2 σ2y + n2Tσ2r + 2 (α− nT )nTσyr (9)
where σyr is the covariance between the domestic output shocks and the fiscal
federation output shocks. From here on it is necessary to assume a specification
for the value function. This is a necessary step in order to use equation 7 as an
optimum condition. Given the structure of our problem the value function is
assumed to be:
X (K) = δKγ
where δ is an unknown parameter. This a priori formulation for the value
function is later confirmed to be correct.
Taking all hypotheses together, and deriving equation 7 in order to C/K
and nT we obtain respectively:(
C
K
)γ−1
− γδ = 0 (10)
−s+ [(−α+ nT )σ2y + nTσ2r + (α− 2nT )σyr] (γ − 1) = 0 (11)
which are the first order conditions of the problem. Additionally, the Bellman
Equation of the problem, evaluated at the optimum, can be written as:
1
γ
Kγ
(
C
K
)γ
− βδKγ +
(
α− C
K
− snT
)
γδKγ +
1
2
σ2kγ (γ − 1) δKγ = 0 (12)
The previous three conditions 10, 11 and 12, completely define the stationary
equilibrium. In fact, the optimal values for C/K and nT are constant and de-
pend only on the uncertainty, technology and preferences parameters. Next, we
proceed with the determination of the optimum values of C/K and nT . Firstly,
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writing equation 11 in order to nT gives the optimal quantity of insurance as a
proportion of total capital stock, that is:
nT =
−s+ α (σ2y − σyr) (1− γ)(
σ2y + σ2r − 2σyr
)
(1− γ) (13)
Secondly, using equations 10 and 12, it is possible to determine the optimal
consumption-capital stock ratio. The expression is:
C
K
=
β
1− γ −
γ
1− γ (α− snT )+ (14)
γ
2
[
(α− nT )2 σ2y + n2Tσ2r + 2 (α− nT )nTσyr
]
Finally, there is the no-ponzy game condition. It states that when t → ∞,
the expected discounted value of the capital stock is zero.
lim
t→∞E
[
Ke−βt
]
= 0 (15)
Note that, given the structure of the model, none of these equations depend
on the value function parameter δ. Therefore, its determination is not neces-
sary and the assumed value function proves to be adequate. Furthermore, it
is necessary to guarantee that C/K and nT are non-negative values. In fact,
consumption must always be positive and we rule out the possibility of having
a country selling insurance, which would be equivalent to nT < 0. Thus, a
necessary condition for fiscal system participation is that:
α
(
σ2y − σyr
)
(1− γ) > s (16)
At this point we briefly analyse the intuition behind equation 13. A country
is willing to participate in the federal fiscal system when the expected costs that
occur in the event the domestic shock is less damaging than the federal shock
(dy > dr), are smaller than the expected benefits that occur when the reverse
happens (dy < dr). When the covariance between these shocks is negative,
the country knows that negative domestic shocks tend to be accompanied by
positive shocks at the federal level. The transfers received in this situation
clearly reduce the negative effect of the domestic output shock. On the contrary,
positive domestic shocks tend to be accompanied by negative federal shocks. In
this case the country transfers funds to the federation. Nevertheless, for a risk
averse country, the net effect is positive. This point is illustrated in Figure 3.1,
which is the standard risk aversion diagram, where:
a = αKt + dy (17)
a1 = αKt + dy1 (18)
b = αKt + dy − nT (dy − dr) (19)
b1 = αKt + dy1 − nT (dy1 − dr) (20)
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Figure 1: Fiscal System and Risk Aversion
For simplicity, we assume a fixed regional shock dr and two possible domestic
shocks dy and dy1 with probability 1/2 and dy1 > dr > dy. In this case, federal
fiscal system participation improves the utility of a risk averse country.
Nevertheless, if the covariance between shocks is positive, these benefits
can be severely diminished. In this situation there is a higher probability of
transferring funds to the fiscal federation even when there is a negative domestic
output shock. Therefore, if the covariance between shocks is sufficiently high,
the country may optimally decide not to participate in the federal fiscal system.
At this point it is also desirable to comment on the financial sustainability of
the federal fiscal system. Taking the perspective of a single country, we can say
that the federal fiscal system is intertemporally in surplus. In fact, the average
value of shocks is zero, which means that the average value of the transfers
made with the federation is also zero. However, the country is expected to
pay for each unit of insurance that it buys. This means that unless s = 0,
there are payments due to the federation in every period. Although the system
runs an average surplus, there may be financing problems in the short run. In
fact, in each period there are countries paying and receiving funds. However,
their different dimensions, measured in terms of total capital stock, as well as
their different shocks may cause some problems. Take the case of a big country
which has a high degree of participation in the system and which faces a negative
output shock that is more damaging than the average shock in the federation.
In this case, the total amount of funds that it requires may be larger than
what is received from smaller countries with low participation in the system
and shocks above the average. These short-run imbalances may be adjusted by
funds previously saved by the federal fiscal authority or provided by a central
monetary authority.
3.3 Equilibrium Analysis
At this point we proceed with the analysis of the equilibrium that has been
obtained in the previous section. Our main interest is to examine what it is that
determines the optimal quantity of insurance that is bought by a single country.
Equation 13 sheds light on this. Firstly, we study the effect of technology on
nT . This effect is described by the derivative:
∂nT
∂α
=
σ2y − σyr
σ2y + σ2r − 2σyr
> 0 (21)
which is always positive for the case of countries taking part in the fiscal feder-
ation. This result can be easily interpreted. In fact, the higher the parameter
α, the stronger the effects of technology shocks on output. In addition, we
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know that when the domestic output shocks are highly volatile and negatively
correlated with the shocks in the fiscal federation there are incentives to buy
insurance. Therefore, in such situations, the higher the parameter α, the higher
the optimal amount of insurance that is bought.
Secondly, the attitude towards risk, which is described by the value of pa-
rameter γ, also plays an important role. As mentioned above, (1− γ) is the
coefficient of relative risk aversion and the effect on the optimal amount of
insurance is given by the derivative:
∂nT
∂ (1− γ) =
s(
σ2y + σ2r − 2σyr
)
(1− γ)2 > 0 (22)
As expected, the above expression is positive and states that the higher the
relative risk aversion, the higher the optimal insurance-capital ratio. Next, we
examine the effect of an increase in the price of insurance s on nT . This is
clearly a negative effect, which is described by the derivative:
∂nT
∂s
= − 1(
σ2y + σ2r − 2σyr
)
(1− γ) < 0 (23)
In this context, it is interesting to examine the effect of having a zero insur-
ance price s = 0. Looking at equation 13 it is clear that the optimal amount of
insurance would be:
nT =
α
(
σ2y − σyr
)
σ2y + σ2r − 2σyr
(24)
It is important to note that this is not the quantity of insurance that provides
full protection against domestic output shocks. This happens because the fiscal
federation that we have been describing does not provide a pure type of insur-
ance. Firstly, the uncertainty in the fiscal system affects the total uncertainty
faced by the country. Secondly, when σyr > 0 there is a higher probability that,
even in the case of a negative domestic output shock, the country may have to
transfer funds to the federation. On the contrary, if we had assumed a pure in-
surance system, the full protection against domestic output shocks would arise.
In this case we would have to consider R = −Tdy, which would mean:
nT =
−s
σ2y (1− γ)
+ α (25)
Thus, with s = 0, the country would optimally choose to have full protection
against domestic output shocks, that is nT = α.
This section continues by examining the effects of uncertainty. We start with
the effect of an increase in the variance of domestic output shocks on nT . The
derivative of equation 13 in order to σ2y is:
∂nT
∂σ2y
=
s+ α
(
σ2r − σyr
)
(1− γ)(
σ2y + σ2r − 2σyr
)2 (1− γ) (26)
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which is an expression without a definite sign. In fact, risk aversion assures
that the denominator is positive but the sign of the numerator depends on
the values of the parameters. There are several effects at work in this type
of situation. Firstly, a higher variance of domestic technology shocks increases
the total uncertainty that is associated with the federal fiscal system, which is
given by σ2y + σ
2
r − 2σyr. For a risk averse country, this increased uncertainty
decreases the optimal insurance-capital ratio. Secondly, the higher volatility of
domestic shocks changes the expected benefits from participating in the fiscal
system. As a matter of fact, when σyr is negative, the higher domestic output
variance increases nT . In this case, when there are stronger negative domestic
shocks the country expects to receive larger transfers that reduce the negative
effects on output. It is also true that when there are positive domestic shocks
the country will tend to transfer more funds to the fiscal federation. However,
for a risk averse country the net effect is positive. In other words, the benefits
of receiving higher transfers when there are stronger negative domestic shocks
are higher than the costs of making higher transfers when the reverse happens.
This positive effect is stronger than the additional costs that come from facing
a larger variance in the fiscal system. When σyr is positive a higher variance of
domestic technology shocks may lead to a reduction in nT . In such cases the
domestic and federal shocks tend to have the same sign. Therefore, an increase
in σ2y makes the country receive less or even pay funds in the event of a positive
shock, but also makes it pay less or even receive funds in the event of a negative
shock. This has a net positive effect on nT , which may not be strong enough
to counter the negative effect that comes from a larger variance in the fiscal
system.
Next, we analyse the effect of an increase in the variance of federal shocks
σ2r on the optimal insurance-capital ratio nT . The corresponding derivative is:
∂nT
∂σ2r
=
s+ α
(
σyr − σ2y
)
(1− γ)(
σ2y + σ2r − 2σyr
)2 (1− γ) < 0 (27)
which, given the restriction that nT > 0, has a negative sign. The first in-
teresting point to note is that the expression above is similar to equation 26,
except for the fact that it relates the covariance σyr with the variance of do-
mestic shocks and not with the variance of the federal shocks. Therefore, the
intuition of the result is close to what has been described above. In fact, an
increase in the variance of the regional shocks decreases the optimal nT because
it increases the uncertainty in the fiscal system. This negative effect is stronger
the higher is the initial quantity of insurance and the smaller is the uncertainty
in the system. Such a result is clear when we rewrite 27 as:
∂nT
∂σ2r
= − nT
σ2y + σ2r − 2σyr
< 0 (28)
Finally, we analyse the effect of an increase in covariance between domestic
and federal shocks on the demand for insurance. The derivative of equation 13
in order to σyr is:
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∂nT
∂σyr
=
−2s+ α (σ2y − σ2r) (1− γ)(
σ2y + σ2r − 2σyr
)2 (1− γ) (29)
which is, again, an expression without a definite sign. It is clear that an increase
in the covariance of shocks decreases the uncertainty in the fiscal system. This
has a positive effect on the optimal insurance-capital ratio. However, an increase
in this covariance also means that there are fewer opportunities for risk sharing,
which has a negative effect on nT . In the next section we develop a compar-
ative dynamics analysis and plot the path of the variables in the stationary
equilibrium.
3.4 Growth and Comparative Dynamics
At this point it is important to analyse how the federal fiscal system participa-
tion affects the mean and variance of the capital growth rate in the economy.
Taking equation 5 we rewrite:
dK
K
= ψdt+ dk (30)
where ψ is defined as:
ψ = α− C
K
− snT (31)
and dk is defined as in equation 6. Substituting the optimal values of the control
variables nT and C/K, the mean and variance of the capital growth rate are
respectively:
ψ =
α− β
1− γ −
1
(1− γ)
(
−s2 + αs (σ2y − σyr) (1− γ)(
σ2y + σ2r − 2σyr
)
(1− γ)
)
− γ
2
σ2k (32)
and:
σ2k = α
2σ2y +
(
−s+ α (σ2y − σyr) (1− γ)(
σ2y + σ2r − 2σyr
)
(1− γ)
)2 (
σ2y + σ
2
r − 2σyr
)
− 2α
(
−s+ α (σ2y − σyr) (1− γ)(
σ2y + σ2r − 2σyr
)
(1− γ)
)(
σ2y − σyr
)
(33)
One of the things that may look strange in these models is that, for γ < 0, the
variance of the capital stock growth rate affects positively the average growth
rate in the economy. This effect works through consumption. For example,
an increase in σ2k leads to a decrease in the consumption-capital ratio, which
increases ψ. Therefore, uncertainty proves to have real effects on the economy.
Next, we present three different scenarios and compare the simulated stationary
equilibrium paths of variables for the cases of optimal system participation and
no system participation. At this point it is necessary to stress that the purpose
12
Exogen. α β γ s σ2y σ
2
r σyr
Values 0.3 0.2 -2 0.001 0.07 0.01 -0.009
Endogen. nT C/K ψ σ2k C/K ns ψ ns σ
2
k ns
Values 0.238 0.2659 0.0338 0.0006 0.2604 0.0396 0.0063
Table 1: Scenario 1
of these simulations is simply to illustrate some different situations that may
occur within the framework of the federal fiscal system that we have examined.
The first scenario is presented in Table 3.1. Note that the second and fourth
rows of the table contain respectively the values assumed by the exogenous and
endogenous parameters in the model. Finally, the letters ns designate the value
assumed by the endogenous variable in the case of no participation in the federal
fiscal system. The first scenario describes a situation where domestic shocks
are more volatile than the regional shocks and there is a negative covariance
between both. The model was calibrated in order to generate useful illustrations
and does not intend to describe any particular economy. Therefore, the values
assumed by some parameters are intentionally exaggerated so as to produce
clear illustrations. Note that the value of parameter s was chosen to be very
small. In fact, large values for s strongly diminish the benefits of the federal
fiscal system, so countries would choose not to participate. In addition, the
value of γ is chosen to be within the interval suggested by Hall (1988).
The simulation is made for 150 periods, following a monthly basis. The
domestic and regional shocks were randomly generated and the Cholesky fac-
torisation was used to assure that they exhibit the desired covariance. Figure
3.2 plots the results of the simulation. As expected, Scenario 1 produces a
positive optimal degree of participation in the federal fiscal system. It can be
observed that the country sacrifices average growth in exchange for a substantial
reduction in uncertainty. Therefore, there is less volatility in the total amount
of resources that is available in each period, which translates into more-stable
paths for capital stock and consumption. In addition, it is clear that the path
for consumption is identical to the path for capital. As demonstrated above,
the consumption-capital ratio is constant in the stationary equilibrium. Finally,
we examine the reason why average growth has decreased. Firstly, fiscal system
participation had a net positive impact on consumption, which was mainly due
to the reduction in σ2k. Secondly, fiscal system participation also means that
the country has to spend resources to buy insurance, which also has a negative
impact on average growth.
The second scenario is illustrated in Table 3.2. Comparing with the first
scenario there are changes on the exogenous parameters that describe the un-
certainty environment. In fact, the situation has been reversed. This time, the
domestic shocks are less volatile than the regional shocks and there is a positive
covariance between them. The results of the second simulation are plotted in
Figure 3.3.
The analysis of the results obtained provides some interesting insights. The
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Exogen. α β γ s σ2y σ
2
r σyr
Values 0.3 0.2 -2 0.001 0.03 0.05 0.009
Endogen. nT C/K ψ σ2k C/K ns ψ ns σ
2
k ns
Values 0.096 0.2645 0.0354 0.0020 0.2640 0.0360 0.0027
Table 2: Scenario 2
Exogen. α β γ s σ2y σ
2
r σyr
Values 0.3 0.2 -2 0.001 0.6 0.01 0
Endogen. nT C/K ψ σ2k C/K ns ψ ns σ
2
k ns
Values 0.2945 0.2656 0.0341 0.0009 0.2127 0.0873 0.054
Table 3: Scenario 3
optimal degree of participation in the federal fiscal system is much less than
in the previous situation. Consequently, the reduction in the volatility of the
amount of resources that is available in each period is also much less. As can
be observed in Figure 3.3, the paths of the capital stock and consumption are
close in the situations of system participation and no system participation. The
effects on average growth and on the consumption-capital ratio are similar to
those of scenario 1, but of smaller magnitude.
Finally, the third scenario is described in Table 3.3. It presents a situation
where the volatility of domestic technology shocks is extremely high when com-
pared with the volatility of regional shocks. In fact, the value assumed by the
variance of domestic shocks is clearly exaggerated and it serves only for illus-
trative purposes. Furthermore, it is considered that the domestic and federal
shocks are independent.
In this last scenario the optimal degree of participation in the fiscal system
is relatively high. As a consequence, the country manages to switch from a
very high volatility situation to a very low volatility situation. Therefore, the
stationary equilibrium paths of capital and consumption are very stable. Figure
3.4 illustrates these results. The effects on average growth and consumption-
capital ratio are, again, similar to those obtained in the previous scenarios but
of greater magnitude. This is due to the larger values for nT . We conclude
this section with a remark. It is obvious that changes in technology, preferences
and insurance cost parameters lead to changes in the optimal insurance-capital
ratio. We have chosen not to present scenarios involving changes in these pa-
rameters because we are mainly interested in the effects of different uncertainty
environments on optimal system participation.
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Figure 3.3: (-) Operating Fiscal System    (- -) No Fiscal System
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4 A Fiscal Federation with a Redistribution Com-
ponent
4.1 The Fiscal System with Redistribution
In this section a different type of federal fiscal system is examined. This time we
assume that the country faces a federal fiscal system whose returns depend on
the capital stock growth rate in the rest of the federation. In other words, the
decision to take part in the federal fiscal system links the path of domestic capital
stock to the general economic performance in the rest of the fiscal federation.
The amount of transfers received from the federation in each period is defined
as:
dR = θT
(
dK∗
K∗
)
(34)
where, T stands for the degree of participation in the fiscal system and dK∗/K∗
is the capital stock growth rate in the fiscal federation. This growth rate is
described by a Brownian motion defined as:
dK∗
K∗
= rdt+ dr (35)
where r is the deterministic trend and dr is the stochastic component with
variance σ2r . Finally, θ is a scale parameter which is positive but inferior to one.
This parameter has no qualitative effect on the results. It is included to scale
down the benefits that the country may take from participating in the fiscal
federation. These benefits should not be too high in order to assure that the
federation runs balanced budgets. Next, we analyse equation 34 and discuss the
essence of the fiscal system that is being proposed. The assumption that the
transfers depend on the path of the capital stock of the federation means that
the system includes both risk sharing and redistribution components. On the
one hand, the system allows a reduction in uncertainty because it provides the
possibility of risk diversification. In fact, when the country takes part in the
system, the total amount of resources that is available in each period depends
not only on the domestic shock but also on the federal shock. Despite being
different from the previous model, this feature makes a risk averse country
willing to participate in the federal fiscal system.
On the other hand, the system allows for redistribution between the coun-
try and the federation. In fact, the difference between what is being paid for
each unit of fiscal system participation and the deterministic rate of return θr,
determines the size and direction of the redistribution. If the price of each unit
of participation is lower than the deterministic rate of return, it means that, on
average, the country is a net receiver of funds. If the reverse is true, then the
country will be, on average, a net contributor to the fiscal system. A crucial
point is to know what it is that may lead a net contributor to take part in the
fiscal federation. In fact, it is obvious that redistribution can take place only
if some countries are net contributors. Although, these countries are being pe-
nalised in terms of redistribution, they still profit from the uncertainty reduction
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effect. Therefore, if the opportunities for risk sharing are strong enough, even
net contributors may wish to participate in the federal fiscal system. This result
has already appeared in the previous section. In fact, by saying that there is a
payment for each unit of insurance, we actually considered countries as average
net contributors. There is also an obvious analogy between this model and the
optimal portfolio selection literature. In this context, one unit of federal fiscal
system participation can be regarded as an asset whose rate of return contains
deterministic and stochastic components.3
The intertemporal resource constraint in this model is then written as:
dK = αKdt+ αKdy − sTdt+ θT
(
dK∗
K∗
)
− Cdt (36)
where s is again the price paid for each unit of fiscal system participation. Next,
grouping the stochastic components on the intertemporal resource constraint we
define:
dk = αdy + θnT dr (37)
As mentioned in Section Three, in this type of model the optimal values for
the control variables are fixed proportions of the state variable. Therefore, the
intertemporal resource constraint must be rewritten as:
dK
K
=
(
α− snT − C
K
+ θnT r
)
dt+ dk (38)
where T/K = nT . In the next subsection we derive the optimum conditions
and determine the stationary equilibrium. Closed form expressions for nT and
C/K are then obtained.
4.2 Optimum Conditions
Note that the model is similar to the one presented in Section Three. Thus, we
take the same steps towards the solution. The stochastic Lagrangian function
is given by:
£ =
1
γ
C (t)γ e−βt + LK
[
e−βtX (K)
]
(39)
where LK
[
e−βtX (K)
]
is the differential generator of the value function. Fur-
thermore, this differential generator of the value function is given by:
LK
[
e−βtX (K)
]
=
∂V
∂t
+
(
α− snT − C
K
+ θnT r
)
K
∂V
∂K
(40)
+
1
2
σ2kK
2 ∂
2V
∂K2
3This discussion raises again the question of knowing if the risk sharing role of fiscal
federations can be fulfilled by capital markets. As mentioned in the introduction, the evidence
for the United States suggests that there is an important role for capital and credit markets
in smoothing product shocks. In the European Union the situation varies across countries,
but it seems that government smoothing is relatively more important. This may indicate the
need for a fiscal federation.
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where V (K, t) stands for the value function of the problem and σ2k is the variance
of the capital stock. As before, the value function is assumed to depend on time
only for the effect of discounting, that is, V (K) = e−βtX (K). At this point we
compute the variance of the capital stock, which can be written as:
σ2k = α
2σ2y + θ
2n2Tσ
2
r + 2αθnTσry (41)
Additionally, the suggested value function will be again:
X (K) = δKγ (42)
where δ is a parameter to be determined. The first order conditions of the
problem are obtained by deriving the stochastic Lagrangian function in order
to C/K and nT . That is:
Kγ
(
C
K
)γ−1
− γδKγ = 0 (43)
(−s+ θr) γδKγ + (θ2nTσ2r + αθσyr) δγ (γ − 1)Kγ = 0 (44)
Additionally, we need the expression of the Bellman Equation evaluated at the
optimum, which can be written as:
Kγ
γ
(
C
K
)γ
− βδKγ +
(
α− snT − C
K
+ θnT r
)
γδKγ+ (45)
+
1
2
σ2kγ (γ − 1) δKγ = 0
Thus, rearranging equation 44 we obtain the expression for the optimal nT
as:
nT =
−s+ θr − αθσyr (1− γ)
θ2σ2r (1− γ)
(46)
Finally, combining equations 43 and 45, the optimum C/K is given as:
C
K
=
β
1− γ −
γ
1− γ (α− snT + θnT r)+ (47)
γ
2
[
α2σ2y + θ
2n2Tσ
2
r + 2αθnTσry
]
It is useful to make a few comments on equations 46 and 47. Firstly, it
is necessary to impose restrictions on the values of the parameters in order to
guarantee that nT is non-negative. That condition is:
σyr <
θr − s
αθ (1− γ) (48)
which means that net contributors take part in the fiscal federation only if the
covariance between domestic and federal shocks is negative. This is the situation
that we have described above. An interesting point is that the variance of
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domestic technology shocks σ2y does not affect the optimal degree of participation
in the federal fiscal system. In fact, neither the costs nor the benefits of taking
part in the system depend on the magnitude of the volatility that is faced
domestically. Finally, if γ < 0, the consumption-capital ratio is negatively
affected by increases in the variance of the capital stock growth rate and it is
positively affected by increased redistribution in favour of the country. In the
next subsection we turn to the study of the properties of the equilibrium.
4.3 Equilibrium Analysis
The analysis of the stationary equilibrium is divided into two parts. First, we
analyse the effects of costs, technology and preferences. Then, we examine the
parameters that describe uncertainty. We begin with changes in the price of
system participation (s) and with changes in the deterministic rate of return
(r). Taking the derivatives from equation 46 we obtain respectively:
∂nT
∂s
= − 1
θ2σ2r (1− γ)
< 0 (49)
∂nT
∂r
=
1
θσ2r (1− γ)
> 0 (50)
These results are clear. When the price of each unit of participation in-
creases, the optimum participation is lower. On the contrary, when the deter-
ministic return of being in the system increases, the optimal participation is
higher. The next derivative captures the effect of changes in the technology
parameter α.
∂nT
∂α
= − σyr
θσ2r
(51)
This effect depends on the covariance between domestic and federal shocks.
Take for instance the case of a negative covariance. An increase in α means
that there is a stronger effect of domestic shocks on output. Therefore, if the
covariance between domestic and federal shocks is negative, the country would
choose a higher participation in the system as a way of balancing the effects of
domestic shocks. Next, the effect of an increase in the coefficient of relative risk
aversion is given by:
∂nT
∂ (1− γ) =
s− θr
θ2σ2r (1− γ)2
(52)
= − nT
1− γ −
αθσyr (1− γ)
θ2σ2r (1− γ)2
(53)
which also has an indefinite sign. Looking at equation 53, it is clear that an
increase in the coefficient of relative risk aversion decreases the optimal partic-
ipation in the system, except for some situations where the covariance between
shocks is negative. One the one hand, an increase in risk aversion raises the
value of the additional uncertainty that country is facing by taking part in the
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fiscal federation. This effect leads to a lower nT . On the other hand, an increase
in risk aversion means that the country will want to take additional advantage
of risk sharing opportunities. This second effect exists only if σyr < 0 and it
leads to a higher nT . Therefore, the net effect of a higher coefficient of relative
risk aversion can only be positive if σyr < 0. Now we turn to the analysis of
the parameters that describe uncertainty. The following derivative shows that
the effect of an increase in the covariance between domestic and federal shocks
is always negative.
∂nT
∂σyr
= − α
θσ2r
< 0 (54)
In fact, the higher the covariance, the lower the opportunities for risk sharing,
which means a lower nT . Finally, the effect of an increase in the variance of
federal shocks is given by:
∂nT
∂σ2r
=
s− θr + αθσyr (1− γ)
θ2σ4r (1− γ)
< 0 (55)
which is always negative, since nT must be defined as a positive value. As
expected, the higher variance of regional shocks turns the return of the fiscal
system more uncertain, which reduces the optimal participation.
4.4 Growth and Comparative Dynamics
This section examines the growth rate of an economy that is taking part in
the federal fiscal system and compares it to the situation where there is no
participation. As before, we present some simulations to illustrate the different
situations that may occur. The capital stock growth rate of the country is
defined as:
dK
K
= ψdt+ dk (56)
where:
ψ = α− snT − C
K
+ θnT r (57)
dk = αdy + θnT dr (58)
Given the solution that was obtained above, we can rewrite ψ and σ2k as:
ψ = α+
(
θr − s
1− γ
)( −s+ θr
θ2σ2r (1− γ)
− ασyr
θσ2r
)
+
γα− β
1− γ −
γ
2
σ2k (59)
and:
σ2k = α
2σ2y + θ
2
( −s+ θr
θ2σ2r (1− γ)
− ασyr
θσ2r
)2
σ2r (60)
+ 2α
( −s+ θr
θσ2r (1− γ)
− ασyr
σ2r
)
σyr
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Parameters α β γ s r θ σ2y σ
2
r
Values 0.3 0.2 -2 0.07 0.09 0.75 0.01 0.01
Parameters σyr nT C/K ψ σ2k C/K ns ψ ns σ
2
k ns
Values -0.009 0.2119 0.2660 0.0335 0.0003 0.2658 0.0342 0.0009
Table 4: Scenario 4
Parameters α β γ s r θ σ2y σ
2
r
Values 0.3 0.2 -2 0.07 0.13 0.75 0.01 0.06
Parameters σyr nT C/K ψ σ2k C/K ns ψ ns σ
2
k ns
Values 0.01 0.2049 0.2672 0.0385 0.0032 0.2658 0.0342 0.0009
Table 5: Scenario 5
Note again that the parameters that describe uncertainty affect the average
growth rate of the capital stock.
Next, we present four numerical simulations that illustrate different types
of stationary equilibria. Table 4.1 describes a situation that we designate as
Scenario 4. In this scenario there are two opposing effects. On the one hand,
there is a negative average rate of return from taking part in the fiscal system
(θr < s), which does not provide incentives for participation. On the other hand,
there is a negative covariance between domestic and federal shocks. Therefore,
there are opportunities to diversify risk, which provide the incentives for system
participation. In this case, the net effect is positive and the country decides to
take part in the federal fiscal system. Figure 4.1 plots the results of the simula-
tion. As expected, fiscal system participation leads to a smaller average capital
growth rate but also to a smaller variance. Scenario 5 describes a very different
situation. The values assumed by the endogenous and exogenous parameters
are presented in Table 4.2. This time the fiscal system has a positive average
rate of return, but shocks present a positive covariance. The results of the sim-
ulation are presented in Figure 4.2. In this case, the optimal participation in
the fiscal system leads to an increase in the average capital growth rate that
more than compensates the negative effects of the increased variance in capital,
output and consumption.
Next, Table 4.3 presents Scenario 6. In this scenario the fiscal system average
rate of return is positive, the variance of regional shocks is much smaller than
the variance of domestic shocks and their covariance is zero. In this case, both
the average and the variance of the capital stock growth rate slightly increase
with system participation. Figure, 4.3 plots the stationary equilibrium paths of
the variables. Note that despite the large optimal value for nT , the participation
and the no participation paths are not much different. In fact, a high degree of
fiscal system participation does not necessarily mean large changes the path of
the domestic variables. It means that the benefits of the federal fiscal system
can only be enjoyed through a large participation, which is equivalent to saying
that the benefit per unit of participation is small. In the present situation, there
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Parameters α β γ s r θ σ2y σ
2
r
Values 0.3 0.2 -2 0.07 0.1 0.75 0.09 0.009
Parameters σyr nT C/K ψ σ2k C/K ns ψ ns σ
2
k ns
Values 0.00 0.3292 0.2591 0.0425 0.0086 0.2586 0.0414 0.0081
Table 6: Scenario 6
Parameters α β γ s r θ σ2y σ
2
r
Values 0.3 0.2 -2 0.07 0.0933 0.75 0.05 0.0095
Parameters σyr nT C/K ψ σ2k C/K ns ψ ns σ
2
k ns
Values -0.02 0.8421 0.2660 0.0340 0.0007 0.2621 0.0378 0.0045
Table 7: Scenario 7
is no large redistribution effect and the additional uncertainty that comes from
the federation is small when compared with the existing domestic uncertainty.
Therefore, the large participation, which is necessary to take advantage of the
small redistribution, does not affect the path of the domestic variables. Finally,
Table 4.4 presents Scenario 7. In this case the average rate of return of the fiscal
system is zero, the variance of domestic shocks is high, the variance of federal
shocks is low and the covariance between both is clearly negative. As a result,
the country chooses to have a high degree of participation in the federal fiscal
system, reducing the variance and the average growth rate of the capital stock.
This is a case where the fiscal system only offers risk diversifying opportunities.
Figure 4.4 plots the results of this last simulation.
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Figure 4.2: (-) Operating Fiscal System    (- -) No Fiscal System
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Figure 4.3: (-) Operating Fiscal System  (--) No Fiscal System
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Figure 4.4: (-) Operating Fiscal System  (--) No Fiscal System
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In the next section we extend this model in order to include the parameter
nT as an argument of the utility function. Therefore, countries will have an
additional motive for taking part in the federal fiscal system.
5 A Fiscal Federation Affecting the Utility Func-
tion
5.1 Fiscal System Participation as a Parameter of the
Utility Function
This section considers that the degree of participation in the federal fiscal system
is an additional argument in the utility function. In other words, countries
place a positive value on fiscal system participation, which is independent of
the benefits or losses that they may take from it. Consequently, countries that
previously did not have enough incentives to take part in the system may now
become participants. At this point it is important to discuss the motives why
it may be adequate to place fiscal system participation in the utility function.
Firstly, it can be argued that there are externalities or political motives, which
are not included in the model, that can be captured by including participation
in the utility function. Secondly, there may be some degree of altruism in the
behaviour of countries. In some cases this may be a reason for taking part in
the fiscal system. The problem of the single country will now be:
Max Eo
∫ ∞
0
1
γ
[
C (t)φ T (t)1−φ
]γ
e−βtdt (61)
where 1 ≥ φ ≥ 0 is the parameter that measures the relative weight of con-
sumption and fiscal system participation in the utility function. As before,
T (t) stands for the amount of participation in the federal fiscal system. The
remaining variables of the model are similar to those of Section Four. Therefore,
the intertemporal resource constraint is written again as:
dK = αKdt+ αKdy − sTdt+ θT
(
dK∗
K∗
)
− Cdt (62)
In the next subsection we proceed with the solution of the model.
5.2 Optimum Conditions
In this case, the stochastic Lagrangian function is given by:
£ =
1
γ
[
C (t)φ T (t)1−φ
]γ
e−βt + LK
[
e−βtX (K)
]
(63)
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where LK
[
e−βtX (K)
]
is the differential generator of the value function. The
differential generator of the value function is again:
LK
[
e−βtX (K)
]
=
∂V
∂t
+
(
α− snT − C
K
+ θnT r
)
K
∂V
∂K
(64)
+
1
2
σ2kK
2 ∂
2V
∂K2
Following the same method that was used in the previous section, the first
order conditions of the problem become:[(
C
K
)φ
n1−φT
]γ−1
Kγφ
(
C
K
)φ−1
n1−φT − γδKγ = 0 (65)
[(
C
K
)φ
n1−φT
]γ−1
Kγ (1− φ)
(
C
K
)φ
n−φT + (66)
+ (−s+ θr) γδKγ + (θ2nTσ2r + αθσyr) δγ (γ − 1)Kγ = 0
In addition, there is the expression of the Bellman equation evaluated at the
optimum, which can be written as:
Kγ
γ
[(
C
K
)φ
n1−φT
]γ
− βδKγ +
(
α− snT − C
K
+ θnT r
)
γδKγ+ (67)
1
2
σ2kγ (γ − 1) δKγ = 0
At this point, using equations 65, 66 and 67 we obtain:
nT =
(
1− φ
φ
)[
1
s− θr − (θ2nTσ2r + αθσyr) (γ − 1)
](
C
K
)
(68)
and also:
C
K
=
(
φ
1− γφ
)[
β − (α− snT + θnT r) γ − 12σ
2
kγ (γ − 1)
]
(69)
These two equations define the optimal values for nT and C/K. The solution
of this two-equation non-linear system is computationally complex. Therefore,
we revert to the case of a logarithmic utility function, which is the important
benchmark that results from making γ = 0. Recall that this situation corre-
sponds to a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to one. In this case the
optimum conditions simplify to:
C
K
= φβ (70)
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nT = (1− φ)
[
β
s− θr + θ2nTσ2r + αθσyr
]
(71)
Finally, solving the second order degree equation 71, two roots are obtained:
nT =
−ρ±√ρ2 + 4 (1− φ)βθ2σ2r
2θ2σ2r
(72)
where ρ = s − θr + αθσyr. At this point there are three important things to
mention. Firstly, note that, ρ2+4 (1− φ)βθ2σ2r is always positive, which means
that the solution is well defined. Secondly, the valid solution is the one generated
by the positive root. In fact, the other solution presents negative values for nT ,
which is something that we have ruled out. Finally, note that equations 72 and
46 generate the same solution for ρ < 0, with φ = 1 and γ = 0. As expected,
to put all the weight in consumption is equivalent to the case where T (t) is not
an argument of the utility function.
5.3 Equilibrium Analysis
This subsection examines the characteristics of the stationary equilibrium that
was just obtained. First, we briefly comment on equation 70, which is the
expression for the optimal consumption-capital ratio. In fact, making γ = 0 is
equivalent to setting the elasticity of substitution between consumption at any
two points in time equal to one. Therefore, it is natural to have the optimal
consumption-capital ratio equal to the intertemporal discount rate β, adjusted
by parameter φ.
Next, we examine how the optimal nT responds to changes in the exogenous
parameters. The effect of a marginal increase in the weight attributed to nT in
the utility function is given by the derivative:
∂nT
∂ (1− φ) = β
(
ρ2 + 4 (1− φ)βθ2σ2r
)− 12 > 0 (73)
which is always positive. As expected, if the utility function puts greater impor-
tance on system participation the optimal nT increases. The effect of a higher
volatility in federal shocks σ2r is more complex. The relevant derivative is:
∂nT
∂σ2r
=
(
ρ2 + 4 (1− φ)βθ2σ2r
)− 12 (1− φ)β
σ2r
− (74)(
−ρ+√ρ2 + 4 (1− φ)βθ2σ2r)
2θ2σ4r
It is not possible to completely define the sign of this expression, but for
reasonable values of the parameters it tends to be negative. We complete this
subsection with the effect of changes in ρ on the optimum nT . The derivative
is given by:
∂nT
∂ρ
=
−1 + ρ (ρ2 + 4 (1− φ)βθ2σ2r)− 12
2θ2σ2r
< 0 (75)
31
which is always negative. Recall that ρ is a function of other exogenous parame-
ters. However, it is possible to obtain the effect of changes on those parameters.
Take for instance the cost parameter s:
∂nT
∂s
=
∂nT
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂s
< 0 (76)
The same thing can be done for the other parameters in ρ and the intuition of
the results is similar to that of Section Four. In the next section we turn again
to the analysis of the capital stock growth rate and simulate the stationary
equilibrium path of variables.
5.4 Growth and Comparative Dynamics
As in the previous sections, the growth rate of the economy is defined as:
dK
K
= ψdt+ dk (77)
where:
ψ = α− snT − C
K
+ θnT r (78)
dk = αdy + θnT dr (79)
Substituting equations 70 and 72, we rewrite:
ψ = α+ (θr − s)
(
−ρ+√ρ2 + 4 (1− φ)βθ2σ2r
2θ2σ2r
)
− φβ (80)
and:
σ2k = α
2σ2y +
(
−ρ+√ρ2 + 4 (1− φ)βθ2σ2r
2σ2r
)2
σ2r (81)
+
(
−ρ+√ρ2 + 4 (1− φ)βθ2σ2r
θσ2r
)
ασyr
Note that in this case the average capital stock growth rate is independent
of the variance of domestic shocks. This results directly from the assumption
that γ = 0 and it means that total domestic uncertainty does not affect the long
run path of the economy. Next, we present a set of simulations for this model.
First we take Scenario 8, which is described in Table 5.1. In this situation
there is a negative deterministic rate of return in the federal fiscal system.
This is compensated by the existence opportunities to diversify risk (σyr < 0)
and by the existence of altruism (1− φ = 0.7). Figure 5.1 plots the stationary
equilibrium path of variables. The first thing to observe is that the transfers are
negative and become more negative as time goes on. This happens because there
is both a strong negative deterministic rate of return in the system and a strong
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Parameters α β φ s r θ σ2y σ
2
r
Values 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.07 0.005 0.75 0.01 0.01
Parameters σyr nT C/K ψ σ2k C/K ns ψ ns σ
2
k ns
Values -0.005 0.8578 0.14 0.1032 0.0031 0.2 0.1 0.0009
Table 8: Scenario 8
Parameters α β φ s r θ σ2y σ
2
r
Values 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.001 0.75 0.01 0.04
Parameters σyr nT C/K ψ σ2k C/K ns ψ ns σ
2
k ns
Values 0.008 0.5310 0.14 0.1073 0.0092 0.2 0.1 0.0009
Table 9: Scenario 9
average capital growth rate. Therefore, as time goes on, the higher values for the
capital stock increase the negative absolute level of transfers. In addition, note
that despite the reduction in volatility, the fiscal system participation strongly
reduces consumption. This is obviously compensated by the gains in utility
that come from system participation. Finally, note that the average capital
growth rate ψ slightly increases with the fiscal federation. In this case the
negative effect, which is caused by the negative deterministic rate of return in the
system, is more than compensated by the positive effect due to the decrease in
the consumption-capital ratio. The economy sacrifices consumption but assures
long-run growth.
Table 5.2 describes a different situation, named Scenario 9. In this situation
there is not only a negative deterministic rate of return in the system, but
also a positive covariance between domestic and foreign shocks. Despite this
negative situation, there is some participation in the federal fiscal system, which
is entirely due to altruistic behaviour.
The results of the simulation are plotted in Figure 5.2. As expected, the
higher volatility of federal shocks, together with the positive covariance between
domestic and federal shocks, generates an increase in total uncertainty, which
translates into the path of the variables. As in the previous scenario, there is a
slight increase in the average capital growth rate and in the negative absolute
value of transfers.
Finally, Table 5.3 presents Scenario 10. In this situation both the determinis-
tic rate of return of the system and the covariance between domestic and federal
shocks are zero. Furthermore, the variance of federal shocks is much higher than
the variance of domestic shocks. Here again, there are no incentives for fiscal
system participation other than the role played by nT on the utility function.
Figure 5.3 plots this last simulation. Both total uncertainty and growth rise
sharply. Note that since there is no loss attached to the deterministic return of
the system, the decrease in consumption spills entirely into additional growth.
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Parameters α β φ s r θ σ2y σ
2
r
Values 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.07 0.0933 0.75 0.01 0.5
Parameters σyr nT C/K ψ σ2k C/K ns ψ ns σ
2
k ns
Values 0.00 0.4619 0.14 0.16 0.0609 0.2 0.1 0.0009
Table 10: Scenario 10
[FIGURE 5.1]
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6 A Fiscal Federation that Responds to Shocks
on the Terms of Trade
6.1 The Fiscal System with Shocks on the Terms of Trade
This section presents an economy where the only source of uncertainty comes
from shocks in the terms of trade. In addition, it is assumed that the federal
fiscal system generates transfers, which partially offset the effects of these shocks
on the terms of trade. This is substantially different from what is assumed in
the previous sections, where domestic and federal uncertainty are attached to
technology shocks. In fact, assuming that uncertainty is related with shocks on
the terms of trade stresses the role of international linkages and allows differ-
ent interpretations. In this sense, changes in trade policy or foreign consumer
preferences can be discussed. Although, substantially different from those pre-
viously presented, the model in this section retains the same continuous time
stochastic framework. First, it is assumed that there is a domestic and a foreign
good, whose terms of trade follow a Brownian motion defined as ϕdt+θdz. The
variance of the shock dz is given by σ2z . Next, the problem of the representative
consumer is assumed to be:
Max E0
∫ ∞
0
1
γ
[
Cφ1C
1−φ
2
]γ
e−βtdt (82)
where C1 is the domestic good, C2 is the foreign good and 1 ≥ φ ≥ 0 is the
parameter that measures their relative weight in the utility function. Finally,
the intertemporal resource constraint is given by:
dK
K
= αdt− C1
K
dt− ϕC2
K
dt− snT dt+ dk (83)
where:
dk = −θC2
K
dz + ωnT dz (84)
As in the previous sections, s stands for the price paid for each unit of federal
fiscal system participation. The parameter nT represents total participation and
ω stands for the rate of return of the fiscal federation.
6.2 Optimum Conditions
The details of the optimisation parallel those of the previous sections. Conse-
quently, the first order conditions of C1K ,
C2
K and nT are:[(
C1
K
)φ(
C2
K
)1−φ]γ−1
φ
(
C1
K
)φ−1(
C2
K
)1−φ
− γδe−βt = 0 (85)
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[(
C1
K
)φ(
C2
K
)1−φ]γ−1
(1− φ)
(
C1
K
)φ(
C2
K
)−φ
− γϕδe−βt− (86)
γ (γ − 1) δe−βt
(
θωnT − θ2C2
K
)
σ2z = 0
−s+ (γ − 1)
(
ω2nT − θωC2
K
)
σ2z = 0 (87)
and the Bellman equation evaluated in the optimum is:
Kγ
γ
[(
C1
K
)φ(
C2
K
)1−φ]γ
− βKγδe−βt +Kγδe−βtγ
(
α− C1
K
− ϕC2
K
− snT
)
+
1
2
γ (γ − 1)Kγδe−βtσ2K = 0 (88)
The solution of the problem is then defined as:
nT =
−s
(1− γ)ω2σ2z
+
θ
ω
C2
K
(89)
C2
K
=
β − γs− 12 γ1−γ s
2
ω2σ2z
1−γ
1−φ
(
ϕ+ sθω
) (90)
C1
K
=
φ
1− φ
C2
K
[
ϕ+ (1− γ)
(
θ2
C2
K
− θωnT
)
σ2z
]
(91)
In the next subsection we analyse the equilibrium that emerges from this set
of equations and present the main results.
6.3 Equilibrium Analysis
The optimal degree of fiscal system participation is defined by equations 89
and 90. However, it is possible to obtain some results simply by looking at
equation 89. In fact, if it is costless to take part in the federal fiscal system
(s = 0), it results that nT = (θC2) / (ωK). When we substitute this optimal nT
into equation 84 it is clear that the variance of the capital stock growth rate
becomes zero. This means that the country makes use of the fiscal federation
to become fully insured against shocks in the terms of trade. On the contrary,
if s > 0 the variance of the capital stock growth rate is positive. It is also
clear that the higher the importance of trade (C2/K), the higher the optimal
participation in the fiscal federation. As a matter of fact, additional foreign
good consumption means a larger exposure to the volatility in the terms of
trade, which leads to a higher optimal nT as a way of reducing uncertainty.
Next, we turn to the analysis of the equilibrium in the benchmark case of
the logarithmic utility function, which is equivalent to setting γ = 0. In this
case the solution simplifies to:
nT =
−s
ω2σ2z
+
θβ (1− φ)
ωϕ+ sθ
(92)
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C2
K
=
β (1− φ)
ϕ+ sθω
(93)
C1
K
= βφ (94)
To examine the effect on nT of changes in the structural parameters of the
model provides some additional interesting insights. We start with the effect of
a marginal increase in the weight of C2 in the utility function.
∂nT
∂ (1− φ) =
βθ
ωϕ+ sθ
> 0 (95)
This derivative is always positive. In fact, a higher (1− φ) leads to an
increase in the optimal consumption of the foreign good, which leads to an
increase in the optimal nT . The effect of an increase in parameter s is given by
the following derivative:
∂nT
∂s
= − 1
ω2σ2z
− θ
2β (1− φ)
(ωϕ+ sθ)2
< 0 (96)
which is always negative. This effect has already been discussed above. Increas-
ing the volatility of the terms of trade is equivalent to adding uncertainty to
the economy, which obviously increases the optimal participation in the fiscal
federation. Therefore, the corresponding derivative is always positive:
∂nT
∂σ2z
=
s
ω2 (σ2z)
2 > 0 (97)
Recall that the shocks in the terms of trade are the only source of uncertainty
in the model and taking part in the fiscal federation is the only way to reduce
it. Next, we examine the effect of an increase in the average terms of trade.
∂nT
∂ϕ
= −θβω (1− φ)
(ωϕ+ sθ)2
< 0 (98)
It is clear that the higher the average terms of trade ϕ the lower the optimal
nT . First, an increase in the average terms of trade makes the foreign good
more expensive, which leads to a reduction in imports. This situation reduces
the exposure to the volatility in the terms of trade and consequently the need
to participate in the fiscal federation. Finally, we look at the effect of changes
in the parameters θ and ϕ. In both cases the sign of the derivative is uncertain.
∂nT
∂θ
=
β (1− φ)
ωϕ+ sθ
− β (1− φ) θs
(ωϕ+ sθ)2
(99)
∂nT
∂ω
=
2s
ω3σ2z
− β (1− φ) θϕ
(ωϕ+ sθ)2
(100)
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An increase in parameter θ raises the effect of the shocks in the terms of trade.
On the one hand, it is optimum to increase the participation in the fiscal fed-
eration as a way to reduce uncertainty. On the other hand, the higher θ leads
to a reduction in the consumption of the foreign good, which has become less
attractive due to the increased price volatility. This reduction in imports lowers
total uncertainty and consequently the optimal nT . Therefore, the net effect is
uncertain. Finally, the net effect of an increase in parameter ω is also explained
by different opposing forces. First, an increase in ω raises the attractiveness of
the fiscal federation because it provides more stabilisation with the same nT .
However, this same effect can lead to a net reduction in total participation.
Second, an increase in ω also increases the optimal C2/K, which increases nT .
6.4 Growth and Comparative Dynamics
This section continues by presenting the expressions for the variance and the
average capital stock growth rate in an economy which is taking part in this type
of fiscal federation. These expressions will allow us to make two final simulations
and illustrate the stationary equilibrium path of the variables. Defining the
capital stock growth rate as:
dK
K
= ψdt+ dk
and substituting the solution generated by equations 92, 93 and 94 it results
that:
ψ = α− β + σ2k (101)
σ2k =
s2
ω2σ2z
(102)
Note that there is a trade-off between lower uncertainty and growth. In fact,
lower uncertainty is achieved through fiscal system participation, which is costly
and reduces growth. It is also interesting to note that the higher the volatility
of the shocks on the terms of trade, the lower the variance of the capital stock
growth rate in the optimum. In fact, a higher σ2z leads to an increase in the
optimal participation, which moves the country closer to the situation of full
insurance. This insurance effect more than compensates the initial effect of
the increase in σ2z . Next, we present scenarios 11 and 12, which are described
in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. Scenario 11 illustrates a situation where the cost of
participating in the system is zero. As a result, the optimal nT is such that
the effects of the shocks in the terms of trade are totally offset by the federal
transfers. Therefore, the variance of the capital stock growth rate is zero. In
addition, there is an increase in the consumption of the foreign good. This
happens because the additional exposure to shocks on the terms of trade is
now insured. Thus, the consumption of the foreign good does not have to
be restrained as a way to reduce the effect of those shocks. Note that this
result applies in any scenario. In fact, equation 102 does not depend on the
consumption of the foreign good. Finally, note that the time series of output
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Parameters α β φ s ϕ θ ω γ σ2z
Values 0.3 0.2 0.5 0 0.2 3 8 0 0.001
Parameters nT C1K
C2
K ψ σ
2
k
C1
K ns
C2
K ns ψ ns σ
2
k ns
Values 0.1875 0.1 0.5 0.1 0 0.1 0.489 0.1022 0.0022
Table 11: Scenario 11
Parameters α β φ s ϕ θ ω γ σ2z
Values 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.02 1 10 8 0 0.005
Parameters nT C1K
C2
K ψ σ
2
k
C1
K ns
C2
K ns ψ ns σ
2
k ns
Values 0.0595 0.1 0.098 0.1013 0.001 0.1 0.095 0.1046 0.005
Table 12: Scenario 12
plus transfers is more volatile when the country is taking part in the system
than otherwise. In fact, there are no domestic technology shocks to offset, so
federal transfers add only volatility to this series. Lastly, scenario 12 illustrates
a situation where the country reduces only a part of the uncertainty. The
variance of the shocks in the terms of trade is higher and their effect is stronger
than in the previous scenario. However, the cost of each unit of fiscal system
participation is also higher. In addition, the average terms of trade equals one,
which means that the foreign good consumption-capital ratio is much smaller
than in scenario 11. In the next section we conclude the paper with some final
remarks.
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Figure 6.2: (-) Operating Fiscal System  (--) No Fiscal System
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7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented several types of federal fiscal systems and produced
expressions for the optimal degree of participation that a country would choose
to have. The paper presents the problem from the perspective of the individual
country, which takes the characteristics of the federal fiscal system as given, and
then takes the optimal participation decisions. These decisions obviously depend
on the properties of the federal fiscal system, as well as on the characteristics
of the country. It has been shown that there is a wide range of situations
that may lead to federal fiscal system participation. For example, by optimally
choosing to participate in the federation, some countries may be exploring risk
sharing opportunities. In this cases countries may be willing to trade some
output growth for a lower variance. In other cases, if the fiscal system contains
redistribution mechanisms, countries may be willing to take a larger variance in
exchange for a faster output growth. In addition, if fiscal system participation is
included as a parameter of the utility function, it is possible to have situations
where the participating country takes a higher variance and a lower growth
simultaneously. In these case participation is due only to altruism. Finally, we
have discussed the case of a fiscal federation which enables a partial offsetting
of the shocks in the terms of trade. It was shown that there is again a trade-
off between uncertainty and growth. The optimal fiscal system participation
depends on the value of imports and typically increases it. This happens because
the additional exposure to the shocks on the terms of trade is now insured. In
addition, it was shown that the higher the volatility of the shocks on the terms
of trade, the lower the variance of the capital stock growth rate in the optimum.
Further research could be done along the following lines. Firstly, other types
of fiscal systems could be modelled. Secondly, it would be important to address
the question of the financial sustainability of the federal fiscal system. Through-
out the paper we have presented fiscal federations which have the potential to
be intertemporally balanced or even in surplus. However, there is no guarantee
that they run balanced budgets in each moment. It would be very important to
model the budgeting process in the federation. Finally it would be interesting to
estimate the stochastic processes that rule the path of shocks in European coun-
tries. This would allow a good calibration of the models and a clear assessment
of the opportunities for the creation of a fiscal federation in the EU.
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